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REPLY INTRODUCTION 
Still Standing could not guarantee access to the property, and thus provide 
marketable title. 
Ruling and Order on Pending Motions, July 17, 2012, Addm.6, R.5050. This Court 
should not hold that "marketable title requires guaranteed access." The trial court 
formed the opinion that because the title commitments included an exception as to 
the private ingress and egress, the seller was therefore unable to provide 
"marketable title." Having concluded there was no "guarantee," none of SSS's 
liability nor damage theories were even explored: 
Still Standing's claims fail because it cannot prove that Shea and Remax 
caused any damage to Still Standing. The transaction failed because Still 
Standing could not guarantee an access to the property. That's the bottom 
line. 
Oral. Trans., R.8389, 53:18-54:13(emphasis added, hereafter "emphasis"), 
Addm.2. As the trial court noted, "there are undoubtedly factual issues that exist." 
Id. The primary claims of Still Standing Stable, L.C. ("SSS") are based on acts and 
omissions related to the way the expired REPC story started as opposed to the way 
it ended, unrelated to any access "guarantee." 
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
There are at least three disputed fact-intensive theories of why the 
transaction in this case failed, with little relevance to SSS's tort claims against the 
Remax brokerage, brokers and agent ("Remax"). First, the trial court concluded 
@ that "[L Jack of a guaranteed access was the sole reason for the -- that the 
transaction failed." Oral Trans., R.8389, 53:l-3(emphasis). Second, Remax now 
offers an alternative two-part theory: 
@ 
[T]he sale fell through because of the seller; that is, the seller would not 
provide a general warranty deed as required by the REPC, and the Property 
had no access. 
Remax Opposition Brief("Remax Opp."), p.x (emphasis). Third, SSS argued that 
the sale fell through because the buyer's attempt to flip the land failed. See Buyer's 
Flip Docs., R.3730-33. The buyer never showed up at the closing in order for SSS 
to produce any deed "to Buyer at Closing" per the REPC paragraph I 0.1 provision. 
@ The buyer never demanded a general warranty deed, never objected to the Gretta 
Spendlove escrow instructions (R.3039-41 ), and both parcels did have access. The 
@ 
buyer "waived" all access and financing issues when the due diligence period 
passed with no objection. Buyer Emmett WatTen's attorney-member filled out a 
separate Seller's Property Disclosure on April 12, 2006, after the due diligence 
6 
period, apparently pursuing $100,000 in earnest money (R.3730, 3733), and 
indicated "direct access to the Property through [x] Private Easement." Addm.9, 
R.3728, if6(G). Remax has never proved its defense theory. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
@ 
It is difficult to see how the standard set by the courts for real estate agents, @ 
above, applies to the agent for the buyer, as RE/MAX was. 
Remax Opp., p.25. 
Additionally, although not occupying a fiduciary relationship with prospective 
purchasers, ... real estate agents have a duty to deal fairly and honestly, despite 
the fact that the broker is acting primarily as the seller's agent. 
West v. Inter-Fin., Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059, 1064 (emphasis added, 
citations and punctuation omitted). R.3184. 
RESPONSE TO REMAX FACTS 
SSS disagrees with this statement by Remax: 
"The court found that the cause of the failure of the sale was not RE/MAX, 
©1 
I 
' i 
I 
but the lack of access ... " @ 
Remax Obj., xii( emphasis). "[L Jack of a guaranteed access was the sole reason 
for the --that the transaction failed." Oral Trans., R.8389, 53:l-3(emphasis). 
"[T]he actual existence or non-existence of an access is irrelevant." Ruling and 
Order on Pending Motions, July 17, 2012, R.5050, Addm.6 (emphasis). 
© 
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"[T]here was no access to the landlocked Property other than by helicopter." 
Remax Obj., x. An alternative to the use of a "helicopter" would be the gate key 
Mr. LeBaron described: "Seller took the Buyer to the private property using a key 
to get through the private gate ... " Buyer's Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, 1115-16, R.0056-57(emphasis)(Filed by Remax co-counsel L. Miles 
LeBaron.) 
"Mr. Quinlan had no ownership interest in RE/MAX to assign." Remax 
Opp., xii. SSS is now the current registered sole owner of Re/Max Elite based on 
the Quinlan sale and assignment. See Cert. of Fact, Utah Div. Corp., Sept 4, 2014, 
R.8123. 
Remax Facts 6-7. SSS properties for sale were not "landlocked." 
Fact 12. The Jarl Allen five acre parcel SSS purchased did make a 
"difference as to access to the Property," because it provided a private easement to 
cross, among other parcels, the Allen land. See Deeds, Addm.5, R.3736, 3739, 
3745, 3747. 
Facts 13-30. First American Title states "There is no means of access from a 
public roadway to the land, but it is assumed there exists a valid and subsisting 
8 
easement over and across an adjoining land for that purpose." First Am. Title 
Comm.118, R.2996 (emphasis). 
Facts 59-60. The agreement with Shea for a commission was conditional: "I 
will give you three percent if we sell that, that piece of property or this 15-acre 
i 
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piece, or any other piece. You find a buyer, we sell it, I'll give you three percent." @ 
Schvaneveldt Depo., 56:11-14, R.3480(emphasis). 
Facts 76-79. Facts relate to the Declaration of plaintiff Hilary "Skip" Wing, 
now claiming that "while the testimony I gave about Aspenwood being the owner 
of the dba may have been mistaken, it was not deliberately false." Wing Deel., 
Sept. 16, 2013, R.7810 (emphasis). SSS never had a chance to depose Skip 
regarding the post-trial Declaration. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
All of SSS's claims were disposed of at the summary judgment stage: 
@ 
[T]he Court finds that. .. lack of a guaranteed access was the sole reason for @ 
the -- that the transaction failed. 
Oral Trans., R.8389, 53: l-3(emphasis). SSS's equally valid alternate factual theory 
of why the sale failed should have been adopted: 
It is just as likely that the Buyer backed out because it decided it could not 
''flip" the land ... 
9 
I 
R.3186 (emphasis). In response, Remax states "it is undisputed that the failure of 
the transaction at issue resulted from SSS's inability to provide access to the 
Property ... " Remax Opp., p. 11 ( emphasis). As the trial court noted, "there are 
undoubtedly factual issues that exist." Id. SSS now raises three general objections 
to the Remax Appellee's Brief ("Remax Obj."): 
1. Remax Now Admits the Seller was SSS. Plaintiffs $362,485.96 
judgment (R.701 7) against Chuck was based on the Remax argument that Chuck 
signed the REPC in his personal capacity as opposed to signing on behalf of the 
true seller Still Standing Stable, L.C. See Schvaneveldt Appeal Case No. 
20130746-CA. Now, after the trial, Remax clarifies that the seller was in fact the 
land owner indicated on the first paragraph of the REPC, "Land LLC Still Standing 
Stables" (R.3237), not Chuck the individual (emphasis added to quotes): 
Did RE/MAX have no contract duties in relation to the seller, SSS, let alone 
any which were breached, ... 
Remax Opp., p.ix. 
The seller, Still Standing Stables (hereafter "SSS") then cross-claimed ... 
Id., ix. 
[T]he seller, Appellant Still Standing Stables, LC (hereafter SSS) refused ... 
@ Id., X. 
10 
The FSBO was between RE/MAX and SSS agents ... 
Id, xi. 
(REPC), but that was between the seller SSS and the buyers. 
Id., xii. 
9. On or about February 7, 2006, a Real Estate Purchase Contract (hereafter 
REPC) was entered into between Emmett Warren and/or Assigns, as buyers, 
and SSS as seller, concerning the Property. R.at 3223. 
Remax Fact 9, xv. 
A For Sale By Owner Agreement (FSBO) existed between SSS and 
RE/MAX and its agent. 
Remax Fact 57, xxviii. 
63. Cathy Code, who signed the FSBO was the girl friend of Mr. 
Schvaneveldt, who acted as an intermediary for Still Standing. R.at 3043. 
Remax Fact 63, xxx. 
RE/MAX represented the buyers in the transaction, and not the seller, SSS. 
Remax Opp., p. 9. 
SSS was selling the Property "by owner". See the For Sale By Owner 
agreement (FSBO) between SSS and RE/MAX. R.at 3238-3239. 
Remax Opp., p. 9. 
Remax should have admitted to Judge Lyon that SSS was the seller: 
Defendants Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code are the sellers of the 
property, which is owned by Still Standing Stable, L.C ... The REPC 
11 
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between Schvaneveldt and the buyer is a binding contract and satisfies the 
terms of the FSBO. 
Jury Inst. 2, Addm. l 0, R.5346. The trial court invaded Chuck's attorney/client 
privileges, 1 Remax violated Chuck's attorney/client privileges,2 the confidential 
dollar amount of Chuck and SSS's mediation offer was used against Chuck3 and 
disclosed on the public docket (R.5101) in violation of Reese v. Tingey Const., 
2008 UT 7, 177 P.3d 605, 61 l(R.5093); U.R.App.P.8A appeal, Case No. 
20120656-CA. After all the litigation and hardship for Chuck to try and raise 
1 
"THE COURT: Mr. Schvaneveldt, did you ever tell your lawyer prior to him 
hearing it in this courtroom that the-- somebody had whited out your title? THE 
WITNESS: Yesterday. But you told me I had to wait--" R.8385, 28:16-
20( emphasis). 
2
"Q And did he approve the for sale by owner agreement as it was prepared? 
MR. FULLER: And--and your Honor, I've got to lodge the objection before she 
answers it to preserve that. Thank you. THE COURT: And it's noted for the record 
and her response is subject to a later connection with Tim Shea. MR. DUNCAN: 
Thank you, your Honor. Q (By Mr. Duncan) And did he approve that? A[Chuck's 
attorney Nina] Yeah." Id., 52:16-25(emphasis). 
"[D]id Chuck ever expressly waive any attorney/client privilege he had with you? 
A[Nina] No." Id., 64: 18-20. 
3 COURT: "I'm going to mle that the parties met, that there was an offer that 
exceeded [dollar amount redacted], which would go to the broker and therefore, it's 
immaterial whether Mr. Wing was --was consulted or involved ... " R.8382,76:24-
77:2. 
12 
$362,485.96 to post a personal bond, Remax now unequivocally states in its Fact 9 
that the REPC was between the "buyers, and SSS as seller" after all. 
2. Remax Exhibit C. Facts 64-74 relate to documents exceeding 50 
pages that were never made part of the record, but should have been produced. 
" [ A ]ppellate courts of this state do not consider new evidence on appeal." 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Franchise 
Agreement was not even signed by Re/Max Mountain States Region until "5-16-
06," meaning after the January 2006 FSBO and February 2006 REPC at issue. See 
Remax Ex. C, p. 41. The Franchise Agreement states "you must obtain any trade, 
fictitious or assumed name registrations as may be required under applicable 
law ... " Remax Ex. C, p.6(emphasis). None of the commission plaintiffs obtained 
the name and admit "it appears that Dale Quinlan was the owner of the dba when 
the documents were signed." R.8087. 
3. Remax Overlength Brief. U.R.App.P. Rule l l(f)(l)(A) states "no 
more than 14,000 words." One Remax Certificate of Compliance in the hard copy, 
p.38, states 18,442 words; the CD Certificate of Compliance states 10,076. It is 
prejudicial for SSS to respond to such a large brief within the allowed reply type-
volume limitation. 
13 
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REPLY ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. Fiduciary Duties and Breach Elements. SSS alleged an express 
breach and "breach of implied fiduciary duties." Remax Opp., p. 28. 
The elements of breach of fiduciary duty based upon the failure to disclose 
material information, ... are ( 1) a fiduciary duty to disclose material 
information, (2) knowledge of the information, and (3) failure to disclose the 
information. 
Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley Corp., 2010 UT App 361,246 P.3d 131, 139. R. 
3115. 
1. A fiduciary duty to disclose material information. Remax quotes 
First Sec. Bank of Utah NA. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1333 
(Utah 1990): 
"[T]here is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship, but it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not only 
confidence of the one in the other, but there must exist a certain inequality, 
dependence, weakness of age, of mental strength, business intelligence, 
knowledge of the facts involved, or other conditions, giving to one 
advantage over the other." Id. 
Remax Opp., p.29 (emphasis). This is a fact-intensive subjective test. Every one 
of SSS's factual assertions alleged in its Complaint, summary judgment briefs, and 
14 
the Schvaneveldt Declaration (Addm.3, R.3190-93), should have been accepted as 
true for purposes of summary judgment consideration, including these examples: 
• SSS had confidence in Remax when Tim was retained as the "go-to man for 
real estate services." Schvaneveldt Deel., Addm. 3, 13, R.3190. 
• SSS depended upon the agent's business intelligence with "complex land 
deals." Id., 14. 
• "The agent's real estate knowledge was believed to be far superior." Id., 15. 
• Seller depended on the agent during the time that SSS thought Tim was 
working for the Seller: SSS Fact 21. The buyer also "believed that he was 
working for Chuck." SSS Fact 17. 
• Seller gave Tim copies of the earlier Stables v. Allen case (SSS Fact 28), 
"expect[ing] and rely[ing] on Tim." Fact 29. 
• Agent acquired knowledge and facts from interacting with lawyers and the 
Buyer that SSS was not aware of. SSS Facts 22, 26. 
• Agent Shea had an advantage over SSS because the agent knew but did not 
disclose the true terms of the Buyer's offer, and the agent/brokerage made at 
least 10 changes or additions to the REPC after the buyer and seller signed. 
SSS Facts 39-40 ("I believe it is my writing."). 
15 
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In addition, Tim admits he was Chuck's agent on the Salt Lake Property 
(Fact I0(B), "Yes."), admits the Confidentiality Agreement was in place during the 
Miles LeBaron meeting and the Ross Allen meeting (Fact 23, "that confidentiality 
agreement would have been in place.''), and Remax collected a commission on 
@ the Salt Lake property purchase (Shea Depo. I, 23:14). 
a. Agent for Still Standing Under the Confidential Agreement. 
Because there was no contract or agency, there certainly were no fiduciary 
duties. 
Remax Opp., p. 29. Remax ignores the confidentiality agreement it signed. On 
@ April 13, 2006, the parties entered into the Confidential Disclosure Agreement ''for 
the purpose of providing Real Estate Services." SSS Fact I. "Tim Shea, 
employed with ReMax Elite ... (hereinafter "Recipient") and Stake Center 
Locating, Inc. and Still Standing Stables, LLC ... (hereinafter "Discloser")." See 
Confidential Disclosure Agreement, SSS Addm. 4, R.3198-3200 ( emphasis added). 
SSS was expressly included as a Discloser. 4 
SSS is mentioned along with Stake Center Locating in the first paragraph 
of the confidentiality agreement, but SSS did not sign off on it. 
4 "[I]n Utah, a fiduciary relationship and a confidential relationship are 
considered one and the same ... " d'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, 147 
P.3d 515, 527 ( emphasis added, citations omitted). R. 3712. 
16 
Remax Opp. p.7 (emphasis added). SSS's former attorney Nina Cleere, on behalf 
of Stake Center and SSS did sign under "DISCLOSER." Remax refers to Nina as 
"SSS's own in-house lawyer." Remax Opp., p.12. The critical signature on the 
Confidentiality Agreement is that of Tim Shea, signing under "RECIPIENT" (SSS 
Addm. 4, R.3200), "Tim Shea, employed with ReMax Elite ... " Id. 
A fiduciary relationship "results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, and consent by the other so to act." City of Grantsville v. 
Redevelopment Agency of Toole City, 233 P.3d 461,472 (Utah 2010). 
Remax. Opp., p. 28. The Remax/Shea signature is evidence of consent by Remax 
to act on behalf of SSS ''for the purpose of providing Real Estate Services," 
subject to SSS's control and conditions. The Agreement is relevant because it 
establishes the fiduciary relationship. Because SSS was party to the agreement, 
"Yeah," Remax committed a breach of the fiduciary duty as a matter of law: 
Q: So that's - would you agree that that would be a material term? If you 
did represent Chuck, that would be something you better be telling him; is @ 
that right? 
A: Yeah. If I had some fiduciary responsibility, which I didn't have with 
him. 
SSS Fact 23. The agreement was in place when the agent learned of the critical 
material information that he never disclosed to SSS: 
17 
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A(Shea): I - based on those dates that - that confidentiality agreement 
would have been in place. 
Fact 23. 
b. Buyer and Seller Believed Shea was Agent for Still Standing. 
Chuck, on behalf of Seller, believed Tim was working for Chuck and Chuck's 
companies. SSS Fact 21. Buyer Emmett Warren ( actually an LLC) through its 
member-attorney John Lish also testified that"/ believed that he was working/or 
Chuck." SSS Fact 17. 
As noted above, the REPC clearly states there is no agent for the seller. 
Aplt. 's Br. Exh. 4, page 2, para. 5 (REPC). 
Remax Opp., p. 30(emphasis). Is Remax referring to the forged REPC with 10 
alterations that it attached to its complaint (SSS Addm. 4, R.3236-41 ), including 
the "CS" initials forged in paragraph 5 (bottom of R.3237) and "FSBO 
AGREEMENT" added to the two top blanks (top of R.3238)? 
Or is Remax referring to the REPC that the trial court insisted be used as an 
exhibit that has no "CS" in paragraph 5 (Addm. 4, bottom of R.3223) and nothing 
added to the two top blanks of paragraph 5 (top of R.3224)? 
Or is Remax referring to the hybrid REPC that First American Title 
produced from its scanned files with no "CS" in paragraph 5 (Addm. 4, bottom of 
18 
R.3245) and "FSBO AGREEMENT" added only to the first blank (R.3246) but not 
the second? Paragraph 5 (Agency) should have been filled out before the REPC 
was signed by the parties. 5 Remax had no agency agreement with either party. See @ 
Rl62-2f-40la(2) ("shall: ... execute a written agency agreement. .. "), R.3117; 
Morgan Report, Addm.7, R.4291, 4296. There are no limited-agent agreement(s) 
with any party. Two days before SSS closed its side of the transaction, Remax 
faxed a "Buyer-Broker Agreement" (R.3252) to the buyer, requesting that the 
buyer initial by "Limited Agents." R.3253. Buyer never signed the limited agency 
agreement. The agent testified he could simply shift fiduciary gears: 
Q. - then you shifted gears from, I'm his agent, now we're going to talk 
about the other property, I'm not your agent? 
A (Shea). Right. 
* * * 
Q. And you just automatically shift gears and go from being the agent 
then you tum - no, you -
A. It's an amazing thing but I did it. 
Fact 48. R.3122. 
5 Remax was never required to produce the original REPC with Tim Shea's ink on 
the earnest money receipt. 
19 
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c. Agent for Still Standing on Salt Lake Land Acquisition. 
"RE/MAX was not the agent of SSS regarding the sale or any sales 
contract." 
Remax Opp., p. 30. On February 24, 2006, Tim Shea, acting as "Buyer's Agent," 
together with "Remax Elite Scott Quinney" as Buyer's Broker, presented an offer 
to purchase a parcel of land in Salt Lake City on behalf of Stake Center Locating. 6 
Fact 1 0(B). See Salt Lake Purchase Contract, Feb. 24, 2006, Addm.4, R.3205-06. 
Under the REPC Addendum 4, Still Standing Stables, LLC became the buyer and 
the closing was moved to May 3, 2006 (same closing date as Huntsville land). 
@ R.3117; REPC Addendum No. 4 is at Addm.4, R.3213. Tim Shea did receive a 
sales commission. Shea Depo. I, 23:14. Tim admitted he was Chuck's.fiduciary. 
Fact 1 0(B). Tim considered Chuck and Still Standing one and the same. Fact 11. 
d. Seller's Agent Presented the First Piece of Land. Remax argues it 
"had no fiduciary obligation." Remax Opp. p.28. As soon as Tim presented 
Chuck's 15 acres to buyers, he was Chuck's agent. "I actually presented both to 
them ... " Fact l0(A). See Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743, 748 (Utah l 982)("agent of the property owner"), R. 3117-18. 
6 Stake Center Locating, Inc. was another company Chuck was managing. 
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2. Knowledge of the information. 
a. Meeting with Buyer and Attorney. Remax does not deny that Tim 
learned critical information from the meeting with buyers and attorneys. Fact 22. 
b. Meeting in Ross Allen's Home. Remax does not deny Tim attended 
the Ross Allen meeting and learned critical information. "I believe they said ... 
Chuck doesn't have a right over that land." Fact 26. Remax does not deny that 
"Shea was also made aware of financing concerns." Fact 51. 
3. Failure to disclose the information. Remax does not deny that 
Remax failed to disclose the information. 
Q (Fuller): Did you call - did you call Chuck and say, Chuck, listen, I'v 
been to this meeting, these buyers think you 're not telling the truth, they 
think there's a problem with the right-of-way, and I just drove up there with 
Wilde, let me tell you what's going on? Did you ever call and have that type 
of conversation? 
A (Shea): Never needed to. 
Q: Why wouldn't you need to? 
A. Because I represented the buyer, not the sellers. 
Fact 23. 
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B. Implied fiduciary duties present a question of fact for the jury. 
Remax cites City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Toole City, 233 P.3d 
461, 4 72 (Utah 20 I 0), and states "The manifestation of consent to form such a 
relationship can be established by contract or implied by factual circumstances. 
Id." Remax Opp., p. 28 ( emphasis added by SSS). The "factual circumstances" 
should have been presented to a jury. Remax does not explain how SSS's 
"implied" relationship could have been kicked out of court on summary judgment. 
All of SSS's evidence of an express fiduciary relationship apply equally to support 
the alternative implied relationship claims. 
C. Trial court erred regarding damage claims and access. 
Still Standing's claims fail because it cannot prove that Shea and Remax 
caused any damage to Still Standing. The transaction failed because Still 
Standing could not guarantee an access to the property. 
Oral. Trans., R.8389,54:6-9 (emphasis). SSS was damaged the moment its land 
~ was bound to the REPC under false pretenses and misrepresentations by the 
licensed real estate agent/brokers. SSS lost the time value of money, I 031 
exchange opportunities (R.3192), and land value while its land was tied up in the 
buyer's land flip scheme and resulting protracted litigation. Agent/brokers 
negligence caused the buyer to sue SSS and Chuck, causing damages. Id. SSS's 
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punitive damage demand was ignored. Compl.18, R.1281. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 
UT 81, 1 35, 57 P .3d 997, I 006 ("fiduciary duty is an independent tort that, on 
occasion, arises from a contractual duty, and can serve as the basis for punitive 
damages."). Damages are related to the way the transaction started as well as the 
way it ended. 
1. Seller did have access to the land. The main theme of the Remax 
opposition is "NO ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY." Remax Opp., p. 1, POINT I. 
"Therefore, the actual existence or non-existence of an access is irrelevant." 
Ruling and Order on Pending Motions, July 17, 2012, R. 5050, Addm.6 (emphasis 
added). Had access been at issue, it would have been a question of fact for the jury 
and SSS did provide conclusive evidence and continues to maintain that it did have 
access to both parcels. See Seller's Property Condition Disclosure, SSS identified 
as Seller, Feb.9.2006, Add.5, R.3718, 16(G); Schvaneveldt Deel., 125, Add.3, 
R.3128; Add. 5, R.3736-39, R.3747, R.3745. 
SSS retained a leading legal expert on real estate issues, attorney Gretta C. 
Spendlove, with Durham, Jones & Pinegar (R.3736) to make sure SSS acquired 
access along the existing road when it purchased the Jarl Allen land. Remax leaves 
a false impression as to "access" testimony from SSS attorney Nina Cleere: 
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SSS 's own in-house lawyer admits that she also was aware that there was no 
access. Facts, above, para. 53-56. 
Remax Opp., p.12 (emphasis). The testimony does not say "no access:" 
Clearly this isn't a public road ... but there was access, but it was through 
this private easement, ... 
Cleere Depo., R.3023:2-5 (emphasis). "And so we -- even though we had this, 
which we consider to be access -- "Cleere Depo., 29:7-8 (emphasis), R.3024. 
SSS never promised to "guarantee access." The standard REPC does not 
have a "guaranteed access" provision, and the title insurance provision was 
satisfied. Q. "[D]id they satisfy their obligations to the title insurance?" 
A:[Attomey Cleere]"As far as I'm aware." Cleere Depo., 125:20-22, R.3029. Title 
insurance is addressed in the REPC at paragraph 6, Addm.4, R.3231. John Doxey 
with Metro Title testified: 
Q. [E]ven with the exclusions that are in there and the exemptions, you still 
could have provided the standard-coverage owner's policy; is that true? 
A [Mr. Doxey]. Yes. 
Doxy Depo., R.2973: 18-22( emphasis). 
2. Buyer land flip scheme failed and lender refused to lend money. 
However, there was no evidence that the plan to flip the Property caused the 
buyers not to buy. 
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Remax Opp., p. 6. The buyers walked away when their "flip" scheme failed.7 The 
Buyer did not have "its own cash for the purchase price" as Tim Shea led Chuck to 
believe. Schvaneveldt Deel. 116, R.3127; Shea Depo., 22: 14, R.3927 ("I had cash 
buyers."). The Buyer, Emmett Warren, LLC, had only $26 on February 28, 2006. 
See Emmett Warren LC Business Checking, Feb. 28, 2006, Addm.5, R.3722. 
Clark Real Estate "did not make the loan to WBL Development, L.L.C." Aff. 
Gary Clark, 112, Dec. 14, 2009 (emphasis). R. 3709-10. 
3. The transaction never contemplated "guaranteed access." Seller 
did provide "good and marketable title:" 
Seller represents that Seller ... will convey good and marketable title to 
Buyer ... Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to 
the following matters of record: easements, ... and rights-of-way; and 
subject to the contents of the Commitment/or Title insurance as agreed to 
by Buyer under Section 8. 
REPC 110.1, Seller Warranties, Addm.4, R.3225(emphasis). Good and marketable 
title does not include any absolute guarantees regarding access to the land: 
"Marketable title is title that may be freely made the subject of resale ... " 
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(citations omitted). 
R.3 710. Summary judgment should also be reversed because the issue of 
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7 Remax attorney explained: "[T]hey call it a.flip, where they sell it very quickly to Gil 
someone else." Oral Trans., R.8389, 7:17-19 (emphasis). 
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"marketable title" would be a question of fact, and the trial court also made a legal 
error in concluding: 
Still Standing could not guarantee access to the property, and thus provide 
marketable title. 
See Ruling and Order on Pending Motions, July 17, 2012, R. 5050, Addm.6. SSS 
did have marketable title regardless of any access II guarantee." Even Remax 
acknowledges "[S]ome people buy under some circumstances such as no access." 
Remax Opp., p. 3. 
Purchase and sale of property without access is all right, as long as the 
parties know of the lack of access, and agree to proceed notwithstanding. 
Remax Opp., p. 3(emphasis). The Seller's disclosures (Addm. 5, R.3718 if6(G) 
"Private Easement"), public records, and commitment for title insurance reports, all 
available during the due diligence period put the buyer on notice of the private 
access details. "The ability to access a parcel of real estate ... is not technically a 
~ "defect" in the title to the property." 11 Couch on Ins. §159:59. Access to Parcel 
Insured, Updated Nov. 2011. R.3711. 
The buyer also waived any access or financing conditions under the terms of 
the REPC, "shall be deemed waived by Buyer. 11 118.2-8.4 at R. 3224. Applying 
the REPC waiver provision to the trial court's conclusion would mean that "lack of 
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a guaranteed access was the sole reason for the -- that the transaction failed (Oral 
Trans., R.8389, 53: 1-3), which was an access issue that had already been waived 
by the buyer." If the lack of" guarantee" was the "sole reason," the buyer could @ 
have just objected under REPC paragraph 8 and recovered its earnest money. But 
the buyer was likely still in pursuit of the $8 million "flip" with $100,000 of ®. 
earnest money. R.3733 (wire funds transfer). 
SSS's post-lis pendens sale to Millennial Partners on July 16, 2008 (Addm.5, 
R.3750-53, 3749 (Snow Christensen & Martineau letter referring to REPC), also 
undermines the trial court's conclusion that "guaranteed" access is required in order 
to produce "marketable title." The sale proves SSS could provide insurable 
"marketable title," just as the standard REPC requires. See Stewart Title Guarantee 
Co., Addm.5, R.3755. SSS pointed out to the trial court that "Still Standing, never 
made any guarantee to guarantee access to the property." R.8389, 23:5-6; 39: 16-17. 
"[B]uyers would have full use and enjoyment of the property by way of a 
general warranty deed, however SSS would not supply one." Remax Opp., 
p.4(emphasis). The deed was to be produced "to Buyer at Closing" per 110.1. No 
place in the record does it show that the LLC buyer showed up at any closing or 
demanded ( 1) a general warranty deed in order to close, (2) guaranteed access in 
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order to close, or (3) any other demands. Instead, the buyer just walked away from 
the transaction. It defies logic to imagine that SSS would not have simply 
produced a general warranty deed or paid for some additional insurance coverage 
had the buyer actually arrived at the scheduled closing with $4.3 million. 
4. SSS bought and sold the property notwithstanding the access. 
Likely, SSS had learned its lesson and warned the buyer that there was no 
access, thus driving the value down. 
Remax Opp., p. 3 (emphasis). There was access to the land. The value went down 
as a result of the falling market conditions, as SSS's expert land transaction/value 
@ witness, Doug Russell, was prepared to explain. R.4005. 
5. Any and all of SSS's alleged damages should be presented to a 
jury. Once the trial court reached its access "guarantee" conclusion, and decided 
"Still Standing's claims fail because it cannot prove that Shea and Remax caused 
any damage to Still Standing (Oral. Trans., R.8389, 53:18-54:13(emphasis), 
Addm.2), the damage elements were not even considered. 
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ISSUE II - NEGLIGENCE AND MISREPRESENTATIONS 
A. Duties and Breach of Duties. A variety of duties were owed by the 
brokerage, brokers, and agent to the Seller regardless of who Remax actually 
represented. See West v. Inter-Fin., Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059, 1064, 
© 
R.3184. Many of the acts and omissions that constitute a fiduciary breach, detailed @ 
above, also constitute a simple negligence cause of action. 
The alleged lack of competence was not demonstrated, nor how any alleged 
incompetence affected the sale. 
Remax Opp., p. 14. SSS didn't get a chance to "demonstrate" that Shea and Remax 
acted improperly or to present any of its negligence, contract, nor damage claims: 
Still Standing raises many other issues, including agency duties, disclosures 
and royalties ... there are undoubtedly factual issues that exist, ... 
See Oral. Trans., R.8389, 53:18-54:13 (emphases), Addm.2. But for the 
misrepresentations by the agent, designed to induce SSS to enter into the contract 
under false pretences, SSS would have avoided the "flip" buyer. SSS would have 
searched for one of the many tn1e "cash" buyers who were flooding into the "hot 
spot" (Shea Tr. Tran., R.8385,96:6) Ogden Valley in 2006 before the bubble burst 
or a contiguous owner interested in more land and water, or a speculator. "[S]ome 
people buy under some circumstances such as no access." Remax Opp., p. 3. 
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If Jury Instruction No. 2 (Addm. l 0, R.5346, bracket added) is correct ("The 
REPC [is] between Schvaneveldt and the buyer ... "), then the agent was 
incompetent by circulating a REPC with SSS's property specified for sale by an 
individual as opposed to SSS. On the other hand, if SSS was the intended REPC 
~ seller, as Remax is now apparently admitting in Remax Fact 9, the agent and 
supervising broker(s) should have reviewed the documents to clarify who the seller 
was. All of these acts and omissions are also relevant to the damage issues. 
Tim Shea's experience lead him to appropriately bring a ready, willing and 
able buyer to SSS ... 
@ Remax Opp., p. 14. The buyer was never ready to close because it never appeared 
at any closing; it just went dark and never showed up. The "Buyer ... became 
unwilling left shortly before closing, because of the access issue." Wallace Aff., 
R.0630(emphasis). The buyer was never able to close with only $26 in its account 
(Addm.5, R.3723) and a denied loan of $3,580,000.00 from Clark. Gary Clark 
Aff., 112 ("Clark Real Estate Co. did not make the loan"), R.1554; R.3709-10. 
SSS asserts that Mr. Shea added "TBD" on his file copy of the REPC. 
Aplt. 's Br. at 22, para. 16 g. 
Remax Opp., p. 18. Tim Shea didn't just forge his "file copy." The licensed real 
professional(s) doctored a fonnal standard form REPC by filling in blanks, adding 
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check marks, adding initials, and adding dates after the buyer and seller had 
signed. See Matter of License ofTopik, 761 P.2d 32, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)( He 
added terms, however innocuous, to an agreement after it had been signed.) Not 
only was there no "TBD" in the new loan dollar amount blank when the REPC was 
signed, it should have at least specified the $3,580,000.00 that the buyer failed to 
borrow from Clark. When considering if a REPC offer should be accepted, there is 
a difference between an empty blank, "$ ______ (b )New Loan" compared 
to "$3,580,000.00(b)New Loan," particularly after the real estate agent represents 
that he has "cash" buyers who own the Arizona Diamondbacks. Shea Depo., 22:14, 
R.3927 ("I had cash buyers.");Addm.4, R.3192, ,r23. Tim should have at least 
disclosed that he added "TBD" to the blank. 
A buyer merely needs to provide sufficient funds at the closing from 
whatever source. 
Remax Opp., p.18. An LLC with $27 is not as likely to "merely" provide sufficient 
funds at closing as a true "cash" buyer in possession of $4.3 million. SSS never 
"accepted" the true terms of the REPC. Seller was induced by the false 
represen ta ti ons. 
As a matter of law, the fraud claims in the counterclaim (R. at 1278-1280) 
clearly lack sufficient particularity. R. at 1278-1280, paras. 97-102. 
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Remax Opp., p. 34. The general allegations and specific detailed facts that apply 
to multiple causes of action should not be ignored under any particular claim, 
including the fraud based claims. Complaint paragraphs 22(b) and (f), for 
examples, do include "where the initials were located." R.1270. The public policy 
(@ and "harm" related to a licensed real estate professional forging initials and 
changing signed contracts should speak for itself, and is described with specificity. 
SSS admits that, ''None of the plaintiffs [RE/MAX]were parties to the FSBO 
and none of the agents had standing to sue SSS ... " Aplt. 's Br. at 68. Thus 
the FSBO cannot serve as a basis for breach of contract or contract related 
claims. 
Remax Opp., p.9. Plaintiffs pursued commission claims as if they were parties to 
the FSBO. After the trial, Skip Wing suddenly announced "Mr. Wing was not a 
party to the For Sale By Owner Agreement ... " R.6781. SSS then discovered 
Dale Quinlan was the actual registered owner of Re/Max Elite when the FSBO and 
REPC were signed, which plaintiffs now admit is true. R.8087. That discovery led 
to the forged "9 March 2006" and "7 March 2006" transfer letters. See Addm.8, 
R. 7346-4 7. The forged letters were recorded with the Division as noted on the 
right margins. Both were "invalidated" after an investigation by the Utah Attorney 
General's counsel assigned to Director Berg's office. R. 7894. It is now apparent 
@ that "None of the plaintiffs [RE/MAX]were parties to the FSBO." 
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B. Causation and Damages. 
Although cause is often a matter of fact, where facts are undisputed, and at 
certain other times, the issue of cause can become a matter of law. 1 
Remax Opp., p.10. Virtually all of the causation and alleged damage claims are 
contested in this case. 
The professional agent is answerable to the public "for breaches of his or her 
statutory duty," whether or not a breach results in damage to a client. Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). 
Matter ofLicense ofTopik, 761 P.2d 32, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), R.4070; Addm. 
7, R.4292. See damage discussion above, damage elements were not even 
considered. Damage claims also include the buyer litigation caused by Remax. 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527,535 (Utah 1993)("[F]ees 
reasonably incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent 
party as an element of damages ... "); Compl., ,r3, R.1280. 
ISSUE III - JURISDICTION AND OWNERSHIP OF REMAX 
Besides the former agent of Aspenwood, Dale Quinlan, never having had 
any right to use the name RE/MAX, nor the right to assign the use of the 
name to the plaintiff, Mr. Quinlan was not even an officer of agent of 
Aspen wood at the time of his attempted assignment to SSS in 2013. 
Remax Fact 74 (emphasis). Remax has already admitted that Dale was the owner 
of the DBA when the documents were signed: 
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Second, it appears that Dale Quinlan was the owner of the dba when the 
documents were signed. 
R.8087. It now admits that the DBA owner was the actual contracting party: 
ReMax Elite is undisputedly a dba, the applicant, or underlying owner of 
the dba, is the party to the contract, doing business as ReMax Elite. 
R.6902. SSS now knows, after the trial, that none of the plaintiffs were parties to 
the FSBO and none of them had standing to sue SSS and others for a commission. 
See SSS's Motion for Summary Disposition, April 23, 2015. 
SSS's claims against the broker and agent should also be reversed based on 
the false Remax Elite interrogatory responses (R. 7304). 
That investigation resulted in Dale Quinlan surrendering his real estate 
broker's license on July 20, 2005, ... 
Remax Fact 75, xxxiii( emphasis). Remax should have disclosed this critical 
discovery fact regarding the Remax principal broker back on October 15, 2007: 
If Remax Elite has ever received a warning or been disciplined by any 
agency of the State of Utah, state the date and nature of every disciplinary 
action, formal or informal, within the last 5 years. 
R. 7360. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Remax Elite objects ... 
Without waiving this objection the answer is, none. 
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Id., R. 7360. After SSS discovered Dale Quinlan, it learned the following: 
QUINLAN, ORION DALE, Re/Max Elite, Layton. Agreed to surrender 
his current broker's license effective July 20, 2005 ... for failing to 
exercise reasonable supervision and for breaching a fiduciary duty owed to 
a principal in a transaction ... 
Utah Division of Real Estate News, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan. 2006, (emphasis), R. 7373. 
Dale Quinlan was a critical witness and the interrogatory should have been 
answered truthfully. The trial court's summary judgment ruling that dismissed all 
of SSS's claims should be reversed to address, among other things, all of the 
foregoing claims and issues in light of the misrepresentations during litigation. 
Remax's false Interrogatory Number 14 response is an additional justification to 
reverse the case and allow SSS to request fees. 
CONCLUSION & RELIEF 
Based on the foregoing, appellant Still Standing Stable, L.C. respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's summary judgment ruling that 
dismissed all of the Seller's claims against the brokerage, brokers, and agent and 
grant the relief requested in this appeal, meaning remand. Based on the 
Confidentiality Agreement and agency relationship SSS had with Remax, along 
with the agent's admission that "Yeah. If I had some fiduciary responsibility," SSS 
respectfully requests that this Court grants SSS's motion and ntle as a matter of law 
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that there was a fiduciary duty and there was a breach, remanding this cause of 
action for consideration of damages. 
SSS should also be allowed to conduct discove1y based on the prior 
misrepresentations by Remax/Skip Wing, depose Mr. Quinlan, and present all of 
SSS's claims and damages to ajmy for consideration. 
SSS is also requesting that the order reversing or remanding the claims 
includes permission for SSS to request fees and costs to date and related to this 
appeal under appropriate circumstances. 
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2015. 
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REPLY ADDENDUM 
9. Buyer's "Flip" Seller's Property Discl., April 12, 2006, R. 3726-29. 
@ 
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04/10/2006 22:38 
(1 
e013s929b,, J 
SELLER'S PROPERTY CONDITION DISCLOSURE -- LAND 
Thia i• a legetly binding contract, If not acndoralood, ooneull an dorney. 
LISTING AGENT.., C~PL! THIS SECTION ONLYI 
SELLER NAME 6azh<U« 4 btJ..~ -;_J/J£ .. @rl 
PROPERTY ADDRESS fh:.wJswllfia. (kT· ~· 
LISTING BROKERAGE Eqytty Beal Estate ("Company, 
NOTICE FROM COMPANY 
PAGE 03 
f'Seller") 
('"Property'") 
Buyer and Seller are advised that the Company and Its agents are trained In the marketing of real estate. Neither the 
Company nor Its agents are trained or licensed to provide Buyer or Seller with professlonal advfce regarding the physical 
condition of any property or regarding legal or tax matters. The Company and Its agents strongly recommend:that In 
connection with any offer to acquire the Property, Buyer retain the professional 5ervlces or legal and/or tax advisors, 
property Inspectors, surveyors, ;and other professlonel$ to satisfy Bi.,yer as to any and all aspects of the physical and legal 
condition of the Property, BUYER IS ADVISED NOT TO RELY ON THE COMPANY, OR ON ANY AGENTS Of THE 
COMPANY, FOR A DETERMINATION REGARDING THE PHYSICAL OR LEGAL. CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY, 
inoJudlng, but not limited to: tho cost, locatlon, avaftablllty and quality of water and water service; the coat; locqtfon and 
avall~O!ty of utility services; the cost of all utlllty service connectlon fees; any environmental issues associated with the 
Property; the boundartes of the Property; any planning, zoning and building -restrictions; any private deed restrictions or 
other restrictive covenants; or the size or acreage of the Property. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLER 
SELLER. IS OBLIGATED UNDER LAW TO DISCLOSE TO BUYERS DEFECTS IN THE PROPERTY KNOWN TO 
SELLER THAT MATERIALLY AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE VAt.UE OF THE PROPERTY THAT CANNOT BE 
DISCOVERED BY A REASONABLE INSPECTION BY AN ORDINARY PRUDENT BUYER. This disclosure form ls 
designed to assist Seller Jn complying with Ulea& dlscloaure requirements. Prease thoroughly disclose your actual 
knowledge regarding the condition of the Property. The company, other real estate agents, and buyers will rely on this 
·,._; disclosure form. 
• Complete the remainder of this fonn. 
• Please be specfflo when describing any past or present Issues or defects (location, nature of problem, etc.}. Use 
additional addendum If necessary. 
• If a question does not agglY to your Property, WRITE "NIA" NEXT TO THE QUESTION. 
1. NATURAL GAS, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONE, CABLe TV 
Please describe, to your knowledge, tha approximate location of the n~reet following utility service nnes: \A. N tural Gas: [ ] Located in ____________ (Name of Stnset/Road) ( } Stubbed to Lot Una 
1\ I ) Other (specify)_ 
,! . Electricity: ( J Located Jn ___ -:::::::::::::::::::-(N_a_m_a_Of_S_treet/R __ oa_d)_[_]_Stu_bbe_d_to_Lot_U_ne 
:,V" {] Other(specify).,... __________________ _ 
~ [ l LOCated in ___________ -'Name Of Street/Road) ( ] Stubbed to Lot Une \J, [ ] Other (specify) _____________________ _ 
D. Cable 1V: [ J Located In ~ __________ (Name of Street/Road) [ ) Stubbed to Lot Une ( J Other (specify) ________________ ,:-:~!!!!~-. 
2, SEWER/SEPTIC TANK f PLAINfiFF'S 
A. To your knowledge, sewer service for the Property Wilt be provided by (chect< applicable box): f EXHIB,r 
[ ) Public Sewer . ~ _ R: 
[xi Septic Tank ii! 
B. If Public Sewer, who 1$ the Public Sewer provider; ii~;;;;~;i;ii;;;:;-;~1;;~~;i;;;:~rn;;;-;.;;;-ll ______ J 
C. If sewer servjce Is Septic Tank, to your knowledge has a percolation test been conducted on the 
Property? · 
o. If a peroolatlon test ~s conduoted, to your knowledge, did the, Property pass the test? 
t JYes C a 
I }Yes( ]No 
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3, CUUNARYWATER 
A. To )'OW' l<nowledge, cuhnary water serv[ce for the Property will be provided by (ohack applicable box): 
, i [J Pubhc Water (N1¥M of water aervlce provider): . 
'-/ . [)Jfrlvat•.Water Company (Name of water service provider): ,11,ia 6fl AM , iJ tv @=6t 
c JPrtvateWell to\ ~"=J-=1--\- \'lo~'=t ~ lo\.\w<--
NOTE: IF WATM SERVICE WILL BE PROVIDED BY PVSUC WATER, SKIP TO SSCTION 4 
B. Private Water Company 
(1) To your knowledge, what Is the approximate looation of the nearost private water company water 
servrce tine? [ J Located In _________ (Name of Street/Road) [ J stubbed to Lot Line 
( ] Other(apecHy)_~--------,.,.._-----------(2) Are th& water share certificates tn your p0fl8ssk>n? If yes, please attach a copy. 
(3) To your knowledge, are wa~r share aBSessments paid In full? 
C. Prldta Wall 
(1) Is a·well presently located on the Prope,t/? 
(2) To your knowledge, ls your water right for the wen represented by a contract with a special 
Improvement or water conservancy district? If "Yes"; what is the number of the district 
conbact? Jo~':15 \.J@!-SL l!-1\"bt"' \Jv.i\--.i:a..1t. 
·(3) If your water right for the wen Is not besed on a contract with a special Improvement or water 
conservancy district, to your knowledge, what rs the State Engineer "Index Number" for your water right? _______ _ 
4. IRRIGATION WATER 
A. Ara there any Irrigation water rights with the Property? 
B. lf ~atlon water rs delivered to you by on Irrigation water company, what is the name of the company'? 
c. Do you·have in your posseaalon water share certiflcates representing your right to receive and use 
Irrigation water? If "Yes"; please attach a copy of eny such share certificate&. 
D. tf the lrrlgatiOn water rights are other than shares In an lnigatlan water company, to your knowledge, 
what Is -the State Engineer "Index Number" or numbers for your Irrigation water 
tigh~? . -----E. Is tllere an Irrigation water source and distribution facility In place for the Property such as ca.nals, 
ditches or pressurized sprlnkler system? H "Yes", what Is the name of the water souroe: 
$ea_[ JNo 
ea-[ ]No 
l JYe•r)(No 
!\Tree[ ]No 
[ )Yes[ ]No 
~es.[ JNo 
[ ]Yes to 
5. SOILS 
A. Ara y~u aware of any settlernQl'lt or heaving of soil on the Property (collapslbla or expansive soils, [ )Yea i ]No 
poorly-compacted fill)? If "Yes", please describe. to your knowledge, tho nawre and location of any .. ~ 
settlement or heaving of so11: 
@ 
@ 
@ 
I @, 
@ 
B. To your knowledge, Is there any fill located on the Property? If "Yes•, please describe, to your [ )Yes rlANo @ 
knowledge, the nature and epproxlmate location of any 1111: · ~" 
C. Are·you aware of any sliding or earth movement on the Property or on any adjoining property [ ]Yes ri'lNo 
(landslldes, falRng rod<_s, debris or mud flows)? lf -Yes", please descrlba the nature and location of the - \' 
slldlng or earth movement; 
D, To your knowledge. does any portion of the Property contain any subsurface, man-made debrhi that [ )Vee L.,\No 
has been buried, covered or abandoned, including without llmltatlon, any discarded or abandoned 
construction materials, concrete footings or foundations, trash, etc? If rrves·', please descnbe tile nature 
and· location of such subsurface debris: 
. . 
E. F'lsaau doecrlbe. to your knowlooge, any action taken lo repair or mitigate any of the Issues described 
5A; 58, 6C or SD: 
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F. Are you aware of any geologtc, solls, engineering, or environmental reports 1hat have been prepared 
for the Property? If "Yes•, pJease attach a copy of any auch reports In your J?OSsese:Jon. 
@ · 8. BOUNDARIES & ACCESS 
\......,/ A. To your knowledge, 18 there anything on ygur Property (such as a fence or any other improvememt) that 
enoroaches (extends) onto any adjoining property? If •Yes", please describe, to your knowledge, the 
nature and apprQxlmata tocall0t1 of any such encroachment 
PAGE 05 
[ ]Yes .it'No 
( JYea~o 
8. To your knowledge, la there anything on any adjoining property (suoh es a fence, deck, or any other [ )Yee rANo 
Improvements) that encroaches (extends) onto your Property? If "Yea•, please describe, to your " f 
lolowled'ge,-the nature and approximate locatlon of any such encroachment 
C. Are you awa"1 of any boundary disputes or confflcts lnvoMng your Property and any adjoining property [ )Yes l'ANo 
or properties? If "Yes". ploasa describe, to your knowledge, the nature of any such boundary dlsputea .. t 
or conflicts: 
D. Ara you aware of any survey(s) ·that have been prepared for the Property or any adjoining property or 
properties? If "Yes", please prcMde a copy of any StJch survey(s) bl your posseesJon. 
E. Are you·aware of any unrecorded easements, or claims for eaaements, effecting the Property? If "Yes11, 
pleas,n!esctlbe, to your knowledge, the nature and approximate location of any such easement(s): 
F. To your·knOwfedge, Is there direct access to the Property from a publlo street/road? 
G. If direct access to the Property Is not from a publfc streat/roa~Jo your knowtedge, Is there direct 
access to the Property through (check applicable box): ~ Private Easement [ J Private 
Street/Road 
7, FLOODING/DRAINAGE 
A. Am you aware of any flooding or rot drainage lasues on the Property? If 11Yes", please d~e. to YQUr 
knoWledge, the nature and approximate loeatiOn of any flooding or lot drainage lnues: 
~~[]No 
VfYea(. ]No 
[ l~es. DclNo Wea[ ]No 
( ]Yesr»o 
B. If therv are flooding or lot drainage Issues, are you aware of any wort< done at the Property to mitigate ( ]Yea (~No 
or to prevent ;my recurrence of any flooding or tot drainage Issues? tf •vea". pleese describe, to your ~ 
knowledge, any WOf1t done at the Property to mitigate or prevent flooding or lot drainage Issues: 
C. Are.you aware of any wettands locatad on the Property? · [ )Ye11 ~No 
D, If you. are aware of wetlands on the Property, to your knowledge, has the Property been mapped for [ ]Yes · No 
wetlande?· If 11Yes11 , please provide a copy of any weUands maps and wetlands permits In your 
possession. · 
E. Are you aware of any action taken to mitigate any wetland Issues through the Army Corps of [ ]Yes f IINo 
Engineers? If -Yes", pleB98 describe, to your knowledge. tho nature of E1ny mitigation work done at the :I\" 
Property; 
a. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
A. Ive you aware of any past or present hazardous conditions, substances, or materials on the Property. ( ]Yes LhNo 
sueh •s methane gas, redloac6ve material, landfill, mtnoshaft, buried storage tanks and tines, or toxic 1 \• 
materlals? If ~es", please describe, to your knowledge the nature of ~ny such hazardous conditions: 
B. If you are aware Of any past er present hEardous conditions, substances, or materials on the Property, ( JY.u rANo 
are you aware of any wor1( done at the Property to mlUgate any such hazardous conditions? If ·vea•, ,, r 
please describe, to your knowledge, the nature of any mlt!gation work: 
C. Are you aware of any environmental reports that have been prepared for the Property? If ''Yes", please [ ]Yes U!No 
attach copies of any sum reports In your possession. 7 r 
"' MOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
\.J A. To your knowledge,, is the Property part of a Homeowner's Association (HOA)? [ )Yea ~No 
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B. If the· Property Is part of an HOA. does lhe HOA lovy dues or assessments for maintenance of common 
areas and/or other common expanse&? 
C, f'pr qu~ns f8.8&rdlng .the H~ Including past. present or future dues or assessments, or regarding 
· flnancJal •tatements, bylaws,.HOA meetings and minutes, lnfoJ11letion may be obtained from the 
following: (Name) ________________________ _ 
(Address) ____________________ _ 
(Phone) 
BY SlG~N"!"!"I N~G!'"'"T=H--.1~$~0!""!'1S~C~.L~O~S,,..,.U=R~E~F-O~R .... M~, SELLER AUTHORIZES THE RELEASE OF HOA 
INFOR¥ATION TO BUYER AND/OR TO BUYER'S AGENT. 
10. UNPAID ASSESSMENTS 
@ 
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A. Are you aware of any HOA, munlclpal, apeolal Improvement district or other assessments that are [ ]Yes t'.)qNo 
present!y owing against tha_.Property? tf-Ves•, please descr1be, to ycur knowledge, the nature and 
amount of any auch unpaid assessment-s: @ 
e: Are you aware of any HOA, municipal, or special Improvement district asseument& thaf have been ( ]Yea ~o 
approved but not yet levled against the Property? If "Yes", please descnbe, to your knowledge, the 
nature and amount of any such approved, but not yet levied, asseasmants: 
11, MISCELLANEOUS 
A. To your knoWledge, is any portiOn of the Property presenUy assessed, for property tax purposes, as [ f(ee ~o 
"Greenbelt"? 
B. Aro you.aware of any eXlsHng or threatened legal action affecting the Property? If "Yes", please [ )Yee r\itNo 
describe, to your knowledge, the.nature of any such legal action: .re-
'--' ACRl:AOE/SQUARI! FOOTAGE 
'-./ Seller represents that any figures provided by Seller In any documents regarding the square footage or acreage of_ the 
Property are not based on any personal measurement by Seller. If the square footage or acreage of the Property la of 
material conoem to Buyer, Buyer is advised to verify the square footage or acreage ·through any Independent sources or 
means deerned appropriate by Buyer. BUYER IS ADVISED NOT TO RELY ON SELLER, THE COMPANY, OR ANY 
AGENTS OF THE COMPANY FOR A DETERMINATION REGARDING THE SQUARE FOOTAGE OR ACREAGE OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
VERIFICATION BY SELLER 
Seller verifies that Seller haa cornpleted lhJs disclosure fonn and that the information contained herein is accurate and 
complete to the best of Seller's actual knowledge aa of the dat& signed by Seller below. SELLER UNDERSTANDS AND 
AGREES THAT SELLER WILL UPDATE THIS DISCLOSURE FORM IF ANY lNFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN 
BECOME$1NACCURATE OR INCORRECT IN ANY WAY. Seller authorizes the Company to provide copies of this 
dlsclosura ftlrm to proapedive liuyers. and to real estate brokers and agents. This dlscloaure fonn Js not a warranty of any 
kind. If Buyer and Seller enter into a sales oontract for the Property, and sueh sales contract Includes. excludes, or 
warrants the condltron of any Item referenced herelll, then to the extent there is a conflict betwean the sales contract and 
any representations contained herein, the terms of ths sales contract shall control. 
Seiter: ~:? Date: t{-I l -tJ .b Seller: Date• 
-.::::::::, -------- ---~---
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ReCEIPT BY BUYER 
Buyer'e signature below acknowledges Buyers receipt of a copy of this disclosure fonn. 
Buyer: ________ Date:. _____ _ Buyer:. ________ Data: _____ _ 
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IO. Jury Instruction No. 2, R. 5346. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ol. 
Nature of the Case 
The case before you today is a dispute over a commission from a failed real estate 
transaction. Plaintiffs and Defendants were involved in an attempt to sell a piece of property. 
Defendants Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code are the sellers of the property, which is owned 
by Still Standing Stable, L. C. Chuck Schvaneveldt is one of the owners of Still Standing Stable, 
L.C. Plaintiffs are the real estate brokers who attempted to find someone to buy the land. 
Plaintiffs entered into a contract with one or more of the Defendants to find a buyer for 
the land. That contract is called the For Sale By Owner (FSBO) commission agreement. In 
performance of the FSBO agreement, Plaintiffs produced a ready, willing, and able buyer that 
Defendants accepted. The buyer and Chuck Schvaneveldt, one of the Defendants, signed a real 
estate purchase contract (REPC) for the sale of the land. The REPC between Schvaneveldt and 
the buyer is a binding contract and satisfies the terms of the FSBO. Ultimately, the transaction 
failed, and the buyer did not purchase the land because the Defendants could not provide title 
insurance that guaranteed access to the property. Importantly, however, the FSBO agreement 
does not require that the land actually be sold in order for Plaintiffs to earn a commission, only 
that the buyer be ready, willing, and able to purchase; thus, the Court previously ruled that 
Plaintiffs satisfied their obligations under the FSBO, and, therefore, have earned a commission. 
In this trial, your duty as jurors is to determine whether the Defendants are responsible to pay the 
commission to Plaintiffs. 
~i346 
